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v. 
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Priority No. 2 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO 
THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
OPINION BELOW 
The unpublished "Memorandum Decision" of the Court of 
Appeals in State v. Pyeatt, slip op., Case No. 880274-CA (filed 
April 20, 1989), is attached hereto as Appendix A. On May 4, 1989, 
Petitioner timely filed a Petition for Rehearing in the Court of 
Appeals. On May 9, 1989, the Court of Appeals denied Appellant's 
Petition for Rehearing (Appendix B). 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals filed its opinion on April 20, 
1989. The Petition for Rehearing tolled the time in which this 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari must be filed. Rule 45(c), Rules of 
the Utah Supreme Court (1986). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(5) (Supp. 1988) and Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2-2(3)(a) (Supp. 1988) . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for 
Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to 
Distribute, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (Supp. 1988); Unlawful Possession of a 
Controlled Substance, to wit: Marijuana, a class B misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1988); and 
Unlawful Possession of Paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(l) (1986), in the Third 
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, Judge, presiding. The Court of 
Appeals affirmed the conviction in a decision dated April 20, 1989. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On March 10, 1987, Judge Sheila McCleve issued a search 
warrant for the premises known as 533 South Montgomery, 1575 West, 
Salt Lake City, Utah (Appendix C). The search warrant authorized a 
search for "[c]ocaine, a white powdery substance, cutting agents, 
packaging and scales." _Id. at 1. 
As the Court of Appeals acknowledged in its opinion, the 
affidavit in support of the search warant contained "somewhat 
inaccurate and incomplete statements." Slip op. at 4 (Affidavit set 
forth in Appendix D). Among such "inaccurate" and "incomplete" 
statements was a statement that, within the past ten days, officers 
had executed two controlled buys at the premises to be searched. 
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Appendix D at 2. This statement was false since neither the C.I. 
nor the officers had been inside the premises at 533 Montgomery 
(Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing held September 17, 1987, 
hereinafter "T", at 19, 20); nor had the officers or the C.I. had 
contact with the occupants of the Montgomery residence (T. 19, 20). 
In fact, at the time the officers executed the search warrant, they 
did not know who occupied the Montgomery residence (T. 19, 20). 
The affiant, Deputy Michael Droubay, stated in the 
affidavit that the officers sent the C.I. into an apartment on 
Atherton Avenue with money and instructions to buy cocaine on two 
occasions (Appendix D at 2-3). On each occasion, shortly after the 
C.I. entered the Atherton apartment, the officers observed a man 
leave that apartment and drive to the Montgomery address. _Id. at 
7. According to the affidavit, that man was "Randy," who the C.I. 
had pointed out as the dealer at the Atherton apartment. 
You affiant received information, at that time, 
from the C.I. as he entered the apartment, he was 
greeted by the suspect, known to us as RANDY. He 
handed the currency to RANDY, and RANDY then left 
the apartment for parts unknown to purchase the 
cocaine. 
Id. at 3 (emphasis added). 
However, according to Droubayfs testimony, although Randy 
was the focus of the investigation at the Atherton apartment (T. 9), 
the person who left the apartment and drove to the Montgomery 
address on each of the two occasions was Brad, a "blonde-haired 
younger fellow" (T. 13). 
His first name was Brad . . . He was identified to 
us by the C.I. at the time of the first controlled 
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buy. We knew who was going to be doing the 
driving; we knew who we had to follow. 
(T. 15-16). 
After reviewing the affidavit*, Droubay's testimony 
changed significantly. He stated that "it's common for dealers of 
controlled substances to use an alias" (T. 18) and suggested that 
the "confusion" about the names was the result of the driver using 
an alias (T. 48). 
Travel time from the Atherton apartment to the Montgomery 
house took twelve to sixteen minutes each way; the "driver" stayed 
at the Montgomery house twenty-two minutes on the first occasion and 
eight minutes on the second (1^ 3. at 2-4). 
According to the affidavit, on the first occasion, the 
C.I. stated that at the time affiant was aware 
that RANDY was at the Montgomery address, C.I. 
received, at the Atherton address, a phone call 
from RANDY saying the "stuff" is on a scale and 
that RANDY would be back. 
Id. at 3 (emphasis added). 
Droubay failed to inform the judge, among other things, 
that, during the time the "driver" was in transit or at the 
Montgomery address on each of the two occasions, no officers were at 
the Atherton apartment and the C.I. and Atherton apartment were 
therefore unobserved during that period (T. 65). At the hearing, 
Droubay attempted to cover this lapse by testifying that an officer 
may have been keeping the Atherton apartment under surveillance 
1
 Until page 16 of the transcript of the hearing, Droubay 
testified from his notes. Defense counsel then supplied him with a 
copy of the affidavit, which he reviewed (T. 16). 
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while the others drove to the Montgomery house (T. 38-9). (See 
Appendix E for transcript of Droubay's testimony regarding lapses in 
surveillance of Atherton apartment.) 
The three other officers involved testified that no one 
remained at the Atherton residence (T. 72, 84).2 
The affidavit also did not inform the judge that the C.I. 
had had no dealings with the occupants of 533 Montgomery and had 
never been there (T. 19, 20) and that persons other than "Randy" 
frequented or lived at the Atherton apartment. 
Deputy Droubay further stated in the affidavit that: 
Independent surveillance also supports the fact 
that there is heavier traffic at night, and that 
the persons residing in the residence are usually 
away during the day. 
Appendix D at 4. However, Deputy Droubay watched the Montgomery 
house on only three occasions. One of those occasions was during 
the day and two were at night. During all three surveillances, he 
saw only three people enter or leave the Montgomery house 
(T. 66-7). Although he stated in the affidavit that the people who 
reside at the Montgomery house were "usually away during the day," 
he testified that he did not know who resided in the house and that, 
during his single daytime visit, he saw children present (T. 59-60). 
The trial court denied Appellant's Motion to Suppress the 
evidence seized from the Montgomery address (R. 79). Defense 
2 Officer Rigby testified further that, had it been his 
case, he would have left an officer to observe the Atherton 
residence so that he would not have had to rely completely on the 
C.I. (T. 80) and that people other than Randy residing at the 
Atherton location were under suspicion (T. 80). 
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counsel renewed her Motion to Suppress at trial, and the trial judge 
again denied such motion. (See Appendix F for trial court's ruling. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. IN DECIDING THAT THE SEARCH WARRANT AND 
SUPPORTING AFFIDAVIT ARE VALID UNDER THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION, 
EXISTING CASE 
THE 
LAW, 
COURT OF APPEALS 
, MISAPPREHENDED 
MISAPPLIED 
THE FACTS, AND 
DECIDED AN IMPORTANT QUESTION OF LAW WHICH SHOULD 
BE DECIDED BY THIS COURT, 
MATERIAL MISREPRESENTATIONS AND OMISSIONS IN THE 
AFFIDAVIT INVALIDATED THE SEARCH WARRANT. 
Mr. Pyeatt claimed at trial and on appeal that the fourth 
amendment to the federal constitution was violated in this case 
where the affiant, Deputy Michael Droubay, intentionally or 
recklessly included material misrepresentations in and left out 
material information from the affidavit (Appellant's Opening Brief 
at 17-31). In its opinion, the Court of Appeals, with very little 
discussion, found that no fourth amendment violation occurred in 
this context. Slip op. at 4-5. 
The Court of Appeals specifically found that implicit in 
the trial judge's finding that Officer Droubay did not act in bad 
faith was a finding that "Droubay did not knowingly, intentionally, 
or recklessly include false statements or omit material information 
in his affidavit [citation omitted]," slip op. at 4. The Court 
determined that such an implicit finding by the trial court was not 
clearly erroneous and that Mr. Pyeatt had "not presented any 
compelling evidence that Droubayfs somewhat inaccurate and 
incomplete statements were made knowingly, intentionally or 
recklessly." Id. The Court of Appeals stated: 
We find it more likely that the misstatements were 
the result of Droubay's confusion, oversight, or 
ineptitude, not the result of a plan to mislead 
Judge McCleve. In any case, we are not convinced 
that any of the statements defendant claims are 
false or wrongfully omitted would be material to a 
determination of probable cause [citation omitted]. 
Contrary to the decision of the Court of Appeals, the 
record in this case establishes that Droubay acted recklessly or 
intentionally in preparing the affidavit, and the falsehoods and 
omissions were material to a determination of probable cause. 
It is well established that "[fjalse statements in a 
probable cause affidavit made knowingly, intentionally, or 
recklessly can invalidate a warrant issued in reliance thereon 
[citations omitted]." State v. Slowe, 728 P.2d 110, 111 (Utah 
1985), reh'g denied (1986), citing Franks v.Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 
98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978); State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188 
(Utah 1986), cert, denied, 107 S.Ct. 1565. 
The analysis under Franks and its progeny requires a 
determination as to whether misrepresentations appear in the 
affidavit and, if so, whether they were included intentionally or 
with a reckless disregard for the truth. If material 
misrepresentations were included with the requisite intent, the 
offensive information is excised and the remaining information in 
the affidavit is reviewed for a determination as to whether probable 
cause exists without the misrepresentations. 
Material omissions may also be relevant to a 
determination of probable cause. See Nielsen, 727 P.2d at 191; 
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People v, Kurland, 618 P.2d 213 (Cal. 1980), cert, denied 451 U.S. 
987 (1981); People v. Winden, 689 P.2d 578 (Colo. 1984). Some 
courts require that the material omissions be inserted to determine 
whether they would quash any probable cause finding, while others 
require more severe sanctions, such as quashing the entire affidavit 
where it can be established that an officer intentionally left out 
facts which might have diminished any probable cause determination. 
Id. 
The three most glaring misrepresentations in the instant 
case occurred in the second paragraph of the statement of facts, in 
the statements depicting who the officers followed to the Montgomery 
address, and in the descripton of surveillance of the Montgomery 
house. 
In the second paragraph^, Deputy Droubay stated that 
within the past ten days, between February 24 and March 5, 19874, he 
had used a confidential informant to execute two controlled buys of 
cocaine at 533 Montgomery Avenue (Appendix D at 2). At the hearing, 
Deputy Droubay acknowledged that this statement was false since the 
C.I. had never been inside the Montgomery address (T. 19, 20). 
3 The first paragraph outlined Deputy Droubay's 
background and experience. He had been an officer for two and 
one-half years at the time he obtained the search warrant (see 
Affidavit, Appendix D at 2). At the time of the hearing on the 
Motion to Suppress, he was unemployed and no longer on the force 
(T. 4). 
4
 The search warrant was signed on March 10, 1987, so 
this statement regarding timing of the buys was also inaccurate. 
Had the buys been made in the ten days prior to signing of the 
search warrant, they would have been made between March 1 and 
March 10, 1987. Judge McCleve apparently made no effort to clarify 
this discrepancy. 
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The affidavit also contained significant 
misrepresentations as to which individual was followed to the 
Montgomery address. The affidavit stated that the C.I. set up his 
deals with the dealer Randy and the dealer Randy then drove to the 
Montgomery address on each of two occasions. The affidavit also 
referred to a telephone call from Randy saying the "stuff" was on 
the scale (Appendix D at 2-3). 
Contrary to the affidavit, during his initial testimony, 
Droubay was unequivocal in pointing out that the C.I. did business 
with the dealer Randy but that a third person by the name of Brad 
drove from the Atherton address to the Montgomery address (T. 9, 
13-15). This discrepancy is critical since, if the C.I. gave money 
to Randy and Randy then drove to the Montgomery address, the 
connection with the Montgomery address is much closer than if the 
C.I. gave money to the dealer Randy and some unrelated third person 
drove to the Montgomery address. 
Droubay also misrepresented his surveillance of the 
Montgomery house. In asking for a no-knock warrant that could be 
served at any time, Deputy Droubay stated that: 
Independent surveillance also supports the fact 
that there is heavier traffic at night, and that 
the persons residing in the residence are usually 
away during the day. 
Appendix D at 4. However, Deputy Droubay watched the Montgomery 
house on only three occasions. He kept no notes but testified that 
only one of those occasions was during the day and two were in the 
evening (T. 66-67). During those visits, Droubay saw only three 
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people enter or leave the house. Although he stated in the 
affidavit that the people who reside at the Montgomery house were 
"usually away during the day" (Appendix D at 4), he testified that 
he did not know who resided in the house and that during his single 
daytime visit, he saw children present (T. 59-60)• The presence of 
children during the day suggests, contrary to the sworn statement of 
Deputy Droubay, that the occupants were present during the day. 
Furthermore, a single daytime surveillance is not sufficient to 
support the conclusion that the occupants were "usually" gone. 
The most glaring omission in this case was the fact that 
all of the officers involved followed the unrelated third person to 
the Montgomery address; no officers stayed at the Atherton address 
so the officers would not have known if the C.I. left or other 
people came to the Atherton house. This is important since the 
controlled substance could have come from the Atherton apartment, 
one of Randy's roommates, someone else entering the Atherton 
apartment while the officers were gone, any number of cars which 
were linked to the Atherton apartment, or any other source that the 
C.I. or Randy or someone else drove to while all the officers were 
gone. 
Hence, Droubay included significant falsehoods in the 
affidavit and left out significant information which might have 
caused the magistrate to refuse the search warrant. 
Contrary to the assertion of the Court of Appeals that 
"[d]efendant has not presented any compelling evidence that 
Droubay"s somewhat inaccurate and incomplete statements were made 
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knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly[]" (slip op. at 4), there is 
abundant evidence in the record that Droubay acted with the 
requisite intent. 
In Nielsen, this Court found the state's contention that 
the false statements included in the affidavit were not made 
intentionally or with a reckless disregard for truth "entirely 
unpersuasive," pointing out: 
A law enforcement officer must be aware not only 
of the need for accuracy in the information 
provided to a magistrate in support of an 
application for a search warrant, but also of the 
importance of absolute truthfulness in any 
statements made under oath. 
Id. at 191 (emphasis added). An officer's awareness of the need for 
accuracy and truthfulness in preparing a sworn affidavit should 
therefore be taken into account in determining whether the officer 
had the requisite intent when he included the falsehoods.5 
The inconsistencies in Droubay's testimony and his 
attempts to cover lapses, when considered in conjunction with the 
affidavit itself6, establish that Droubay acted intentionally or 
with a reckless disregard for the truth when he prepared the 
affidavit. 
5
 As the Court acknowledged in Franks, a police officer 
is also aware of the haste with which an affidavit in support of a 
search warrant is often reviewed. 57 L.Ed.2d at 680. In the Third 
Circuit Court in Salt Lake County, the judge generally signs search 
warrants during a brief recess in arraignments. 
6
 Because it is unlikely that an officer who 
intentionally misrepresents facts in an affidavit will acknowledge 
that fact when subpoenaed for a motion to suppress, one of the few 
ways in which a defendant can establish that the affiant had the 
requisite intent is to analyze the testimony and the affidavit step 
by step. 
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Defense counsel subpoenaed Droubay for the Motion to 
Suppress and directly examined him. During the first few minutes of 
direct examination, Droubay acknowledged that the focus of the 
investigation was a person named "Randy" who lived in the Atherton 
apartment (T. 9) and that there were usually at least two persons in 
the apartment. He further testified that a person other than the 
dealer Randy, a "blonde-haired younger fellow," was the driver and 
that the C.I. had told him prior to the first buy that Brad would be 
driving (T. 15-16). 
The dramatic change in Droubay's testimony after he 
reviewed the affidavit suggests that he acted recklessly or 
intentionally in preparing the affidavit. After Droubay reviewed 
the affidavit, he suggested that Brad and Randy were the same 
person, that he knew Randy would be driving, and that Randy was 
using an alias (T. 18, 41, 47, 62). This was contrary to his 
earlier testimony that he knew a person other than Randy would be 
driving. 
In addition, Droubay attempted to suggest that the 
Atherton apartment had been covered by an officer despite the fact 
that Droubay had read his report and there was no indication in the 
report that such coverage had occurred (T. 38-9) (see Appendix E). 
The other officers involved, none of which were in charge as Droubay 
had been, clearly remembered that no one covered the Atherton 
apartment (T. 72, 74-5, 84). This apparent fabrication while 
testifying suggests the ease with which Droubay intentionally 
misrepresented the facts. 
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The location of the false information in the affidavit 
also supports a determination that Droubay intentionally included 
the falsehoods. The second paragraph containing the 
misrepresentation that two controlled buys occurred at the address 
to be searched was the first information concerning the basis for 
the search warrant to reach the magistrate. The organization and 
substance of the remainder of the affidavit did little to dispel the 
incorrect impression initially given the magistrate and thus added 
support to a finding that the deputy intentionally misrepresented 
the facts to the magistrate. 
Given the recognition in Nielsen of an officer's 
knowledge of the need for accuracy in an affidavit, the glaring 
misrepresentations in the affidavit, the completely contradictory 
testimony offered by Droubay after reviewing the affidavit, and 
Droubay's attempts to cover up his failure to leave officers at the 
Atherton address, the record in this case establishes that, at the 
very least, Deputy Droubay acted recklessly, and more likely 
intentionally, in preparing the affidavit. 
Pursuant to the fourth amendment approach in Franks, 
intentional falsehoods are excised from the affidavit and the 
affidavit is then reviewed for a determination of probable cause. 
Without the falsehood regarding a controlled buy occurring at the 
Montgomery house and absent the falsehood that the C.I. gave money 
to the dealer who then drove to the Montgomery house, the affidavit 
is left with information that the C.I. entered the Atherton 
apartment on only two occasions and an unknown, unrelated third 
- 13 -
party drove to the Montgomery house. The significant omission that 
the Atherton apartment was not under surveillance for the thirty to 
sixty minutes while all the officers followed the third person to 
the Montgomery house must also be considered. 
Under a totality of the circumstances approach, this 
information is not sufficient information for a finding of probable 
cause. Other than the "coincidence in timing" of the two visits to 
the Montgomery house by a person who had been present in the 
Atherton house, nothing in the affidavit indicated that cocaine sold 
to the C.I. came from the Pyeatt house and not from the car or the 
Atherton house or some other source. See State v. McManus, 243 
N.W.2d 575 (Iowa 1976) . 
In State v. Hadd, 619 P.2d 1047 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980), 
relied upon by the Court of Appeals, the officers followed a known 
drug dealer to the appellant's apartment twice in one evening. The 
second trip to the appellant's apartment occurred after the C.I. 
received a sample of the marijuana, agreed to purchase more, then 
watched the dealer make a telephone call. Immediately after the 
telephone call, the dealer drove directly to appellant's apartment. 
Thereafter, officers arrested the dealer, found a bag of marijuana 
in his possession, and immediately obtained a telephonic search 
warrant for appellant's apartment. 
In the present case, the connection between Mr. Pyeatt's 
home and the transaction which occurred at the Atherton address is 
more attenuated than the connection between the appellant's home and 
the transaction in Hadd. Several people were at the Atherton 
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address who could have supplied the drugs to the C.I. The two 
transactions took place several days apart and the search warrant 
was obtained several days after the second transaction. The person 
driving to the Montgomery address was not a known drug dealer and 
could have just as easily been an unwelcome guest who was asked to 
leave during the transaction or a decoy who officers eagerly 
followed. 
Furthermore, no one ever saw controlled substances in the 
Montgomery house or knew who lived there. See State v. Hansen, 732 
P.2d 127 (Utah 1987); State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1983). 
The minimal surveillance in no way established that drug operations 
were being carried on at the Montgomery house. 
Finally, the minimal number of transactions (two) and the 
time lapse suggest not only that there was not enough information in 
this case to establish probable cause to search the Montgomery house 
but also that, even if controlled substances had been at the 
Montgomery house at the time of the two transactions, there was no 
indication it would still be there.7 
After excising the intentional or reckless 
misrepresentations in the affidavit, and considering the intentional 
or reckless omissions, officers lacked probable cause to search the 
Montgomery premises. Mr. Pyeatt respectfully requests that this 
1
 Officers did not watch the Atherton apartment between 
the two transactions so the amount of drug activity at that location 
was not known nor was the potential for other sources. Furthermore, 
when the officers searched the Montgomery house on March 10, 1987, 
they found only a small amount of cocaine. 
- 15 -
Court grant a writ of certiorari on this issue and review the 
federal constitutional claim raised herein. 
POINT II. BY REFUSING TO ADDRESS THE STATE 
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE, THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED 
TO DECIDE AN IMPORTANT QUESTION OF STATE LAW WHICH 
SHOULD BE DECIDED BY THIS COURT. 
In his opening brief at pages 31-38, Mr. Pyeatt asked the 
Court of Appeals to interpret Article I, § 14 of the Utah 
Constitution differently from the fourth amendment where material 
misrepresentations are included in an affidavit or material 
information is omitted. In particular, Mr. Pyeatt argued that, 
under the Utah Constitution: (1) material misrepresentations which 
are intentionally included should invalidate the entire affidavit 
(rather than excising the offensive portions). See People v. Cook, 
583 P.2d 130 (Cal. 1978); State v. Malkin, 722 P.2d 943 (Alaska 
1986); and (2) where an officer negligently includes falsehoods, 
those falsehoods should be excised and the remainder of the 
affidavit reviewed for a determination of probable cause. See 
People v. Theodor, 501 P.2d 234 (Cal. 1972) (modified on denial of 
reh'g); People v. Cook, 583 P.2d 130 (Cal. 1978). 
The Court of Appeals dealt summarily with Appellant's 
state constitutional argument: 
Because we find no precedent or rationale 
compelling a different result under our state 
constitution, we do not address the issue. 
Slip op. at 4-5. 
Contrary to the assertion of the Court of Appeals, case 
law and rationale supporting a separate analysis exist in this case. 
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Appellant's argument under the state constitution was that 
our constitution offers greater protection in a search and seizure 
context than does its federal counterpart. History provides a 
rationale for finding greater protections under Article 1, § 14 of 
the Utah Constitution than under the fourth amendment to the federal 
constitution since the Utah Constitution was adopted at a time when 
many of the citizens of this state may have had an interest in 
greater protections from intrusions into their homes.8 
Furthermore, Utah case law explicitly suggests the 
possibility of a different construction for the Utah Constitution in 
this specific context. 
In State v. Nielsen, this Court pointed out that its 
decision that the falsehood contained in the affidavit did not 
invalidate the search warrant was not dispositive of how the issue 
might be resolved under Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution. 
The Court acknowledged that "the federal law as it has developed 
since Franks v. Delaware [438 U.S. 154 (1978)] is not entirely 
adequate" and that "[t]here is no stronger argument for developing 
adequate remedies for violation of the state and federal 
constitutional prohibitions on unreasonable searches and seizures 
than the example of a police officer deliberately lying under oath 
in order to obtain a search warrant." _ld. at 192-3. Hence, Nielsen 
suggests that an analysis under the Utah Constitution which is 
8
 The State had recently outlawed polygamy and federal 
troops were stationed in Utah to control activities. Many citizens 
still practicing polygamy had an interest in protecting against 
entry into their homes. 
- 17 -
distinct from that in Franks may be appropriate where 
misrepresentations are included in an affidavit in support of a 
search warrant or omitted therefrom.9 
In addition to Utah case law explicitly suggesting the 
possibility that the Utah search and seizure provision be 
interpreted differently from its federal counterpart, case law from 
other jurisdictions supports the separate analysis advanced by 
Mr. Pyeatt. 
Cases decided prior to Franks v. Delaware, such as United 
States v. Hunt, 496 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1974), and United States v. 
Thomas, 489 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1974), held that "[i]f the affiant 
intentionally makes false statements to mislead a judicial officer 
on application for a warrant, these render the warrant invalid 
regardless of whether or not such statements are material to 
establishing probable cause." Such a rationale makes sense since, 
where an officer has intentionally misrepresented some facts in an 
affidavit, the entire affidavit becomes suspect. 
Since Franks, several courts have held that intentional 
misrepresentations in an affidavit invalidate the entire affidavit 
and warrant under a state constitutional analysis. See, e.g., 
9 The issue of whether an intentional or reckless 
misrepresentation in an affidavit automatically invalidates the 
search warrant and the issue of the effect of negligent 
misrepresentations were not directly presented to the high court in 
Franks. In Franks, the appellant "conceded that if what is left is 
sufficient to sustain probable cause, the inaccuracies are 
irrelevant" and that if "the warrant affiant had no reason to 
believe the information was false, there was no violation of the 
fourth amendment." 438 U.S. at 172. 
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State v, Malkin, 722 P.2d 943, 946 (Alaska 1986); State v. Caldwell, 
384 So.2d 431 (La. 1980); People v. Cook, 583 P.2d 130 (Cal. 1978). 
In Cook, the Court noted: 
Contrary to the case of negligent mistakes, 
excision of deliberate falsehoods in an affidavit 
does not leave the remaining allegations unaffected 
and hence presumptively true. The fact that the 
misstatements are intentional injects a new element 
into the analysis, to wit, the doctrine that a 
witness knowingly false in one part of his 
testimony is to be distrusted in the whole. 
583 P.2d at 140 (emphasis added). 
The Cook Court summed up that "although the court can 
excise the intentionally false allegations it cannot presume the 
remainder to be true. Lacking a reliable factual basis in the 
affidavit, the court has no alternative under settled constitutional 
principles but to quash the warrant and exclude the product of 
search. [Citations omitted.]" _Ld. at 141. 
Furthermore, there is case law from other jurisdictions 
supporting Appellant's argument that negligent misrepresentations 
must be excised and the remaining portions of the affidavit 
considered in determining whether to uphold the warrant. See 
People v. Theodor, 501 P.2d 234 (Cal. 1972) (modified on denial of 
reh'g); People v. Cook, 583 P.2d 130 (Cal. 1978). 
Hence, rationale and precedent both exist for deciding the 
issue differently under the Utah Constitution. Appellant's analysis 
under Article I, § 14 is especially compelling since (1) a review of 
the affidavit and Officer Droubay's testimony shows, by 
circumstantial evidence, that Officer Droubay acted intentionally or 
- 19 -
recklessly in putting together the affidavit, which would require 
invalidation of the warrant without further analysis pursuant to 
Appellant's state constitutional theory, and (2) assuming, arguendo, 
that Officer Droubay did not act intentionally or recklessly, the 
negligence of including obviously false information would require 
excision of that false information and therefore invalidate the 
warrant due to the lack of probable cause in the remaining portions. 
Mr. Pyeatt respectfully requests that this Court review 
this issue and address his state constitutional arguments. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Pyeatt respectfully requests that this Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari be granted and that this Court review the issues 
addressed herein. 
Submitted this 3 day of^ tfune, 1989. 
rOOKE C. WELLS 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
C.tddtf 
FOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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ORME, Judge: 
In this appeal, defendant raises two related challenges 
to his conviction.1 First, he claims Officer Droubay's 
affidavit fails to allege sufficient facts upon which Judge 
McCleve could base her finding of probable cause to issue the 
search warrant. Second, defendant claims Judge Rigtrup erred 
by denying defendant's motion to suppress the cocaine and 
related contraband found during the search of defendant's 
house. We find no error and affirm defendant's conviction. 
We first consider whether Officer Droubay's affidavit in 
support of the search warrant established probable cause to 
search defendant's residence. Defendant correctly 
acknowledges 
1. Defendant's third challenge, that the search warrant lacks 
particularity/ is without merit. 
the scope of our review, which is limited to determining 
whether Judge McCleve "had a substantial basis to conclude 
that in the totality of the circumstances, the affidavit 
adequately established probable cause for the issuance of a 
search warrant." State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 129 (Utah 
1987) (per curiam). "Probable cause" in this context "is 
nothing more than a reasonable belief that the evidence sought 
is located at a place indicated by the policeman's 
affidavit." United States v. Dill, 693 F.2d 1012, 1014 (10th 
Cir. 1982). Moreover, we give great deference to Judge 
McCleve's determination that probable cause existed for 
issuing the warrant. See, e.g., Hansen, 732 P.2d at 129; 
State v. Miller, 740 P.2d 1363, 1364 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Defendant claims Droubay's affidavit is an insufficient 
basis for the warrant because it (1) does not establish a 
"fair probability" that cocaine was located at defendant's 
residence, (2) does not specifically and clearly establish the 
basis for Droubay's attestation to the confidential 
informant's reliability, and (3) is stale due to the length of 
time between the last controlled buy and the issuance of the 
warrant. We find no merit in any of these contentions. On 
the contrary, our review of the affidavit convinces us that 
Judge McCleve "had a substantial basis to conclude that in the 
totality of the circumstances" probable cause existed to issue 
the warrant. 
Droubay's affidavit, while somewhat inaccurate and 
overstated in certain aspects, nonetheless establishes a 
pattern of "dealer/broker" drug trafficking. Droubay claims 
that he and his fellow officers arranged two controlled buys 
of cocaine at the Atherton apartment.2 on both occasions, 
the "dealer" left the apartment and was followed by the 
officers to defendant's residence. When the "dealer" returned 
2. While one sentence in the affidavit states that the 
cocaine was obtained from defendant's residence, we fail to 
see how this technically inaccurate representation could have 
misled Judge McCleve, especially in light of the next thirteen 
paragraphs discussing in detail the two controlled buys. The 
affidavit contains a number of clear statements to the effect 
that the "dealer" actually produced the cocaine at the 
Atherton apartment, but was believed to have retrieved it from 
defendant's residence. We of course reject the suggestion 
that Judge McCleve may not have carefully read the entire 
affidavit. 
a80274-CA 2 
to the Atherton apartment, he delivered cocaine to the 
confidential informant. On one of those occasions, the 
informant received an incriminating telephone call from the 
"dealer* during the time the officers knew the "dealer- was at 
defendant's residence. This sequence of events establishes 
probable cause to believe the "dealer" retrieved the cocaine 
from defendant's residence, and that more cocaine and related 
contraband could be found there. While the officers' 
methodology is certainly not a model for a narcotics officer 
training manual, we cannot say that Judge McCleve erred in 
issuing the warrant. Defendant's specific challenges do not 
change our conclusion. 
First, we are not convinced that Judge McCleve erred 
simply because the affidavit did not specifically allege that 
cocaine had been seen in defendant's residence, nor that the 
"dealer" ever stated he was going to defendant's residence to 
get the drugs. £fiS State v. Hadd, 127 Ariz. 270, 619 P.2d 
1047, 1053 (Ct. App. 1980) (probable cause to search 
"broker's" house was established by an affidavit alleging that 
drugs were found in "dealer's" car immediately after he was 
seen leaving "broker's" house). While such particular 
allegations would certainly be helpful in establishing 
probable cause, defendant cites no authority rendering them 
mandatory. In fact, we think such an inflexible approach is 
inconsistent with the totality of the circumstances standard. 
Second, we do not find it significant that the warrant 
was issued after only two controlled buys, see Hadd. 619 P.2d 
at 1049-50, 1053, or that the last buy possibly took place two 
weeks before the warrant was obtained. See State v. Hansen, 
732 P.2d 127, 131 (Utah 1987). While at least one case 
suggests in dicta that perhaps two trips to the "broker*s" 
house by the "dealer" during controlled buys would be 
insufficient to establish probable cause, State v. witwer, 642 
P.2d 828, 832 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982), that case was not 
decided under a "totality of the circumstances" standard. We 
decline to adopt the "three-buy minimum" defendant, in effect, 
proposes. Instead, affidavits in support of search warrants 
must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis. The totality of the 
circumstances alleged in Droubay's affidavit, coupled with two 
controlled buys, is sufficient to establish probable cause to 
search defendant's residence. 
Finally, we cannot agree that the warrant was improperly 
issued because much of the information contained in the 
affidavit was relayed to Droubay by a confidential informant, 
aan?74-ra 
or perhaps even by other officers. See State v. Nielsen, 727 
P«2d 188, 192 (Utah 1986) ("The use of hearsay evidence to 
establish probable cause does not necessarily undercut the 
validity of a warrant*"), cert, denied. 480 U.S. 930 (1986). 
Droubay stated that his informant was reliable and based his 
attestation on specific prior experiences with the informant. 
Defendant has not convinced us that Judge McCleve erred in 
concluding Droubay's affidavit demonstrated informant 
reliability. Ss£, e.g., State v. Anderson. 701 P.2d 1099, 
1102 (Utah 1985) (informant's veracity can be established 
through an affidavit stating that the informant has previously 
given reliable information). 
For the foregoing reasons, we hold Judge McCleve did not 
err in issuing the warrant based on Droubay's affidavit. 
Our final inquiry is whether Judge Rigtrup erred in not 
suppressing the evidence. We will affirm this ruling unless 
the factual assessment underlying it is clearly erroneous. 
State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987). A trial 
court's factual assessment is not clearly erroneous unless our 
review of the evidence leaves us with a "definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been made.* IdU (quoting 
Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.. 395 U.S. 100, 
123 (1969)). Defendant takes exception to Judge Rigtrup1s 
ruling that Droubay did not act in "bad faith." Implicitly, 
Judge Rigtrup concluded that Droubay did not knowingly, 
intentionally, or recklessly include false statements or omit 
material information in his affidavit. SSLfi State v. Slowe, 
728 P.2d 110, 111 (Utah 1985). We are not persuaded that this 
ruling is clearly erroneous. 
Defendant has not presented any compelling evidence that 
Droubay*s somewhat inaccurate and incomplete statements were 
made knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly. We find it more 
likely that the misstatements were the result of Droubay's 
confusion, oversight, or ineptitude, not the result of a plan 
to mislead Judge McCleve. In any case, we are not convinced 
that any of the statements defendant claims are false or 
wrongfully omitted would be material to a determination of 
probable cause. See id. at 111 (minor discrepancies in 
affidavit "did not undermine the essential truth of the 
allegations"). The basic facts we hold to establish probable 
cause are essentially undisputed. 
Because we find no precedent or rationale compelling a 
different result under our state constitution, we do not 
address the issue. Accordingly, we affirm defendant's 
conviction. 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
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SEARCH WARRANT 
No. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
To any peace officer in the State of Utah. 
cmi 
Affidavit under oath having been made this day before me by 
Droubay - Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office, Narcotics 
Proof by 
C. Mike 
Division, I am satisfied that there is probable cause to believe 
That (X) on the premises known as 533 South Montgomery, 157S West, 
the east side of a red brick duplex, with white trim and 
a red front porch with black rod iron railing. 
In the City of Salt Lake, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, there 
is now certain property or evidence described as: 
Cocaine, a white powdery substance, cutting agents, packaging and 
scales. 
and that said property or evidence: 
(X) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed; or 
(X) has been used to commit or conceal a public offense; or 
(X) is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a means 
of committing or concealing a public offense; or 
(X) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal 
'-«"'• w<a« iak9 CoApv'-.*'-r:w.u<ruif Court $>,• 
certify that m* tWfy'0** Uke Q-^J* ' S*ate of 
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PAGE TWO 
SEARCH WARRANT 
You are therefore commanded: 
(X) at any time day or night (good cause having been shown) 
(X) to execute without notice of authority or purpose, (pro< 
under oath being shown that the object of this search m; 
be quickly destroyed or disposed of or that harm m, 
result to any person if notice were given) 
to make a search of the above-named or described premises for tl 
herein-above described property or evidence and if you find the sar 
or any part thereof, to bring it forthwith before me at the Fifi 
Circuit Court, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, or retain su< 
property in your custody, subject to the order of this court. 
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND and dated this /" day of March, 1987. 
c ' L/. /" ?{{, < V"cc 
" JUDGE'OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT 
APPENDIX D 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
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IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
): ss 
County of Salt Lake ) 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
BEFORE: SHEILA MCCLEVE 450 SOUTH 200 EAST 
JUDGE ADDRESS 
The undersigned affiant being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
That he has reason to believe 
That (X) on the premises known as 533 South Montgomery, 1575 West, 
the east side of a red brick duplex, with white trim and 
a red front porch with black rod iron railing. 
In the City of Salt Lake, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, there 
is now certain property or evidence described as: 
Cocaine, a white powdery substance, cutting agents, packaging and 
scales. 
and that said property or evidence: 
(X) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed; or 
(X) has been used to commit or conceal a public offense; or 
(X) is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a means 
of committing or concealing a public offense; or 
(X) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal 
conduct, possessed by a party to the illegal conduct; 
Affiant believes the property and evidence described above is 
evidence of the crirae(s) of UNLAWFUL DISTRIBUTION OF A CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE FOR VALUE and UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE 
WITH THE INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE IT FOR VALUE. 
PAGE TWO 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
The facts to establish the grounds for issuance of a Search Warran 
are: 
Your affiant is a Salt Lake County Deputy Sheriff with tw 
and a half years of law enforcement experience. Your affiant i 
presently assigned to the Narcotics Division. Your affiant has bee 
trained by P.O.S.T., Utah Police Academy, in the identification o 
narcotics. Your affiant has also received continued education an 
training regarding narcotic dealings through experienced polic 
officers and on the job experience. 
Within the past ten days, between the period of February 24t 
and March 5th, 1987, your affiant has executed two controlled buys o 
cocaine, using a confidential informant. Hereafter, referred to a 
C.I. to obtain cocaine at 533 South Montgomery, the east duplex, Sal 
Lake City, Salt Lake County, Utah. 
On the first occasion, the C.I. met with your affiant, an 
assisting Detectives, where the C.I. was searched. The C.I. had n 
money, nor controlled substances, on his person. The C.I. was give 
$275.00, consisting of two $100.00 bills, three $20.00 bills, on 
$10.00 bill, and one $5,00 bill, and given instructions to purchas 
3.5 grams of cocaine, known as an tfeight ball". 
At that point, the C.I. left your affiant's vehicle an 
walked directly to 4545 Atherton, in the Lexia Haven Apartmen 
Complex, building #7, Apartment 144. He was observed by your affian 
to enter that apartment building. He did not make any stops, diver 
his paths, or make contacts with anyone, up to that point. 
Approximately two minutes later, a male white, approxiraatel 
5'9", 150 pounds, blonde, curly hair, known as RANDY, was observed t 
your affiant leaving the apartment, went to the parking lot, and gc 
into a 1982 Datsun, red in color, Utah listing: MVT 214. Thi 
suspect was then followed by the Narcotics Squad to 533 Sout 
Montgomery. He made no stops, nor did he divert his path, prior t 
arriving at the Montgomery address. The suspect parked his car i 
front of the Montgomery address, and was observed by myself ar 
Deputy Herlin, to enter the east door of the red brick duplex at th* 
time. The suspect stayed there for approximately twenty-two minutes 
and then was observed by Deputy Judd leaving the same door of tl" 
residence, getting back into his vehicle, and then again proceed* 
south bound on Interstate 15. 
He was followed by myself and the Narcotics Squad, direct! 
back to 4545 Atherton, Apartment #144. He made no stops, nor did t 
divert his path this time either. The suspect arrived back at tt 
apartment in approximately fifteen minutes, walked directly from hi 
car back into the apartment, where approximately five minutes latei 
the C.I. was observed to exit the apartment, and walk directly bac 
to your affiant's vehicle. 
PAGE Three 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
The Col. was re-searched at that time, finding no U.S. 
Currency, or controlled substances on him, besides a small paper 
bindle, inside a plastic bag, which contained a white powdery 
substance. The package, containing the white powdery substance, was 
field tested by your affiant. A portion of which resulted in a 
positive indication for cocaine. 
C.I. stated that at the time affiant was aware that RANDY was 
at the Montgomery address, C.I. received, at the Atherton address, a 
phone call from RANDY saying the "stuff" is on a scale and that RANDY 
would be back. 
Your affiant received information, at that time, from the 
C.I. as he entered the a"partment, he was greeted by the suspect, 
known to us as RANDY. He handed the currency to RANDY, and RANDY 
then left the apartment for parts unknown to purchase the cocaine. 
On the second occasion, the C.I. met with your affiant and 
assisting detectives, where the C.I. was searched again, finding no 
U. S. currency or controlled substances on him. At that point, he 
was given $220.00 in U. S. currency, consisting of two $100.00 bills, 
and one $20.00 bill. The C.I. was given instructions at that time to 
purchase two grams of cocaine. The C.I. got back into his vehicle, 
which had also been searched by your affiant, drove directly to 4S45 
Atherton, Apartment #144. He did not divert his path, nor make 
contact with anybody. He then left his vehicle and walk directly to 
apartment #144, and was given entrance. 
Approximately three minutes later, the same suspect, known as 
RANDY, exited the apartment and walked directly to the 1979 Mercury 
Monarc, with Utah listing: 161 AMW. He got into the vehicle and 
proceeded out of the apartment complex, east on 45th South, and north 
on Interstate 15, followed by the entire Narcotics Squad. 
The suspect remained northbound on Interstate 15 to the 
Redwood Road exit, took the Redwood Road exit to 5th South, went from 
5th South, directly to 533 South Montgomery, where he was observed bv 
Deputy Rigby to walk directly to 533 Montgomery and enter. This 
being sixteen minutes, from the time he left the Atherton address. 
The suspect stayed inside the residence for approximately 
eight minutes, and then was observed by Deputy Rigby to exit the 
residence, walk directly to his car, and proceeded to 5th South, then 
to Redwood Road, then back to Interstate 15 southbound. 
At this point, the suspect drove directly back to 4545 
Atherton, #144, without diverting his path, or making contact with 
anybody. He was observed by Deputy Rigby to park the car in the 
parking lot, and walk directly to #144 and enter. 
PAGE FOUR 
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
One minute later, your affiant observed the C I , exit the 
residence, walk directly to his vehicle, and drive to a pre-arranged 
point, without diverting his path, or making contact with anyone. He 
was re-searched approximately four minutes, as was his vehicle, 
finding no controlled substances, other than a small paper bindle, 
containing a white powdery substance, which he was instructed to 
order from the suspect known as RANDY. 
The package that contained the white powdery substance, a 
portion of which was tested by your affiant. It resulted in a 
positive indication for cocaine. 
Your affiant considers the information received from the confidential 
informant reliable because (if any information is obtained from an 
unnamed source) 
Your affiant and assisting Detectives, have had the C.I. 
purchase cocaine on at least eight separate occasions, and each 
representation made was born out by producing either cocaine or 
marijuana. The C.I. has also purchased marijuana and cocaine on 
several occasions for your affiant and assisting Deteccives. 
Your affiant has verified the above information from the confidential 
informant to be correct and accurate through the following 
independent investigation: 
Your affiant has used information given to him by the C.I. to 
make arrests of your narcotic dealers, said to obtain other search 
warrants. The previous search warrants obtained by your affiant and 
other Narcotic Detectives using information, and controlled buys from 
the C.I. have all been confirmed by producing controlled substances, 
as a result of the authorized searches, including narcotics 
packaging, and resulting in arrests of persons for violation on those 
premises. 
WHEREFORE, the affiant prays that a Search Warrant be issued for the 
seizure of said items: 
(X) at any time day or night because there is reason to 
believe it is necessary to seize the property prior to it 
being concealed, destroyed, damaged, or altered, or for 
other good reasons, to-wit: 
Your affiant has purchased cocaine, via the C.I. on two 
different occasions. Independant surveillance also supports the fact 
that there is heavier traffic at night, and that the persons residing 
in the residence are usually away during the day. 
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It is further requested that (if appropriate) the officer executing 
the requested warrant not be required to give notice of the officer's 
authority or purpose because: 
(X) the property sought may be quickly destroyed, disposed 
of, or secreted. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this |y/'day of March, 1987. 
JUDSE IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE 
OF UTAH 
APPENDIX E 
1 Q. Assuming that this — well, since it is 
2 February or March, there was no question but that it was dark 
3 outside? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. Likewise, it would have been dark when you 
6 followed the person in the car to the Montgomery address? 
7 A. Yes. 
8 Q. And I understand the weather may have been bad 
9 on at least one of those occasions? 
10 A. The weather, I don't recall. 
11 Q. You don't recall a blizzard or snowstorm? 
12 A. No. We were driving pretty fast, so I think 
13 it was fairly clear, 
14 Q. Now, when you left the Atherton address, who 
15 did you leave to watch the Atherton apartment to make sure that 
16 I no one entered or left? 
17 
Q. Who? 
A. 1 believe it was Deputy Vaun Delahunty. I 'm 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
A. I believe it was Deputy Vaun Delahunty. 
not really sure on that, however. 
Q. Would you look at your reports to see if it 
indicates in any place that any officer remained at the 
Atherton address? 
A. I have looked at my report, and it does not 
indicate. And, again, I'm not sure if Vaughn was there or not, 
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1 Q. I f Off icer Delahunty was not there# then no — 
2 A. .Then no one was, 
3 Q- — one would be there? 
4 A. Then no one was there. 
5 Q» And assuming just for argument sake that no 
6 one was left there, then you nor no other officer could testify 
7 tjiat the confidential informant did not leave in the interim 
8 and come back; is that right? 
9 A. That's correct, ye<3. 
10 Q. And likewise, no one could be able to verify 
11 whether anybody how had previously been in the apartment may 
12 have left and returned? 
13 A. ghat's also correct* 
14 Q. pr that some unknown third individual may ha\ 
15 come into the Atherton apartment while you were gone? 
16 A. That's also correct, yes. 
17 Q• And you were not in any type of contact waN;h 
1 8
 y ° u r confidential informant during that time? 
19 A. No. 
20 Q. Now, with regard, again, to the confidential 
21 informant, specifically, what was the arrangement made with 
22 this person for his work with you? I'm not talking about this 
23 case, particularly. You said that there would not be charges 
24 filed against that person. What type of charges and how many 
25 J were not submitted for screening or were not filed against the 
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APPENDIX F 
1 defense that this taking of evidence from the 
2 Montgomery Street address was in violation of Mr. 
3 Pyeatt's State and Federal Constitutional rights. 
4 Thank you. 
5 THE COURT: The Court reviewed both 
6 memorandums, both memoranda in this case. I did take 
7 fairly complete notes on the matter. I've reviewed 
8 that. I have a reasonably accurate memory. And the 
9 Court observes in making a probable cause 
10 determination ruling, we are dealing with 
11 probabilities, not certitudes. 
12 Given the fact that the Court has to 
13 allow some credence to the conduct of the issuing 
14 magistrate -- the Court must assume that Judge McCleve 
15 deals in preliminary hearings on a regular basis, that 
16 she issues warrants on a regular basis and she's 
17 engaged in that business with greater intensity and 
18 familiarity than is this Court, so the Court must 
19 assume that she has perhaps a greater level of 
20 familiarity with these things than the reviewing 
21 Court. 
22 The Court in these cases gets these 
23 motions to suppress, and it is not the most frequent 
24 thing. But the Court observes a consistent pattern in 
25 these kinds of actions. And your affidavit does state 
27 
1 that there were eight transactions, as I recall, with 
2 the confidential informant. Prior to these 
3 transactions, we have two controlled buys before the 
4 warrant issued in this case. And although there are 
5 some inaccuracies, therefs nothing in the testimony of 
6 Officer Drewbay, there's nothing in the affidavit, 
7 that suggests any bad faith on the part of the 
8 officers involved in this case. 
9 The pattern of going to one location, 
10 the strip search, giving the CI money and having him 
11 make contact, transfer the money and then go to 
12 another place to get the drugs is a pattern that the 
13 Court has observed in every case it's been involved 
14 in. And from that, I think the officers can see a 
15 common pattern from which they can draw reasonable 
16 inferences . 
17 And given all of those circumstances, I 
18 think there's sufficient -- reviewing the affidavit 
19 and considering the totality of the circumstances, the 
20 Court finds that there's nothing insufficient about 
21 the affidavit sufficient to vitiate the probable cause 
22 determination made by Judge McCleve, therefore denies 
23 the motion to suppress. 
24 MS. WELLS: Your Honor, as the Court is 
25 aware, that is the case. I mean, what I had suggested 
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